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Abstract—Shannon introduced the classic model of a cryptosys-
tem in 1949, where Eve has access to an identical copy of the
cyphertext that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon defined perfect
secrecy to be the case when the mutual information between the
plaintext and the cyphertext is zero. Perfect secrecy is motivated
by error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share
a secret key. Wyner in 1975 and later I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner in
1978 modified the Shannon model assuming that the channels
are noisy and proved that secrecy can be achieved without
sharing a secret key. This model is called wiretap channel model
and secrecy capacity is known when Eve’s channel is noisier
than Bob’s channel.
In this paper we review the concept of wiretap coding from
the satellite channel viewpoint. We also review subsequently
introduced stronger secrecy levels which can be numerically
quantified and are keyless unconditionally secure under certain
assumptions. We introduce the general construction of wire-
tap coding and analyse its applicability for a typical satellite
channel. From our analysis we discuss the potential of key-
less information theoretic physical layer security for satellite
channels based on wiretap coding. We also identify system
design implications for enabling simultaneous operation with
additional information theoretic security protocols.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, communication transmission for civilian space
missions have not been employing security mechanisms.
Moreover, safety is considered prevalent over security in
civilian space missions, which makes the trade-off between
safety and security a specific design feature of space mis-
sions. Space agencies are fostering civilian cryptography
research to develop schemes for security enforcement which
can be recommended by relevant standardization bodies
such as the Consultative Committee for Space Data Sys-
tems (CCSDS) [1]. The current Space Data Link Security
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(SDLS) protocol can provide security services to the exist-
ing CCSDS family of Space Data Link (SDL) protocols:
Telecommand (TC), Telemetry (TM) and Advanced Orbiting
Systems (AOS). CCSDS does not mandate at which layer
the encryption algorithm is used. Security can also be
implemented at the upper layers or simultaneously at multiple
layers.
On the other hand, civilian commercial missions, have pri-
marily focused on improving system capacity, Quality of
Service (QoS) and of Experience (QoE). Successful standards
such as the Digital Video Broadcasting Standard DVB-S2X
enables multiple interoperable DVB-S2 ecosystems. This is
because the physical layer is highly modular with powerful
modulation and coding schemes. Notably, confidentiality,
integrity or data origin authentication must be taken care of
at the upper layers through e.g. standard internet security
protocols. However, it is well known that such protocols
through e.g. tunnelling may lead to significant transmission
overhead in clear detriment of QoS. Furthermore, ecosystems
implementing other known protocols are prone to their known
corresponding attacks.
The engineering approach to the design of physical layer
security mechanisms of space links mostly relies on low
probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability of detection
(LPD) waveforms. LPI and LPD waveforms along with
signal processing and channel coding techniques are highly
effective against jamming attacks and interception. Their
anti-jamming performance can be quantified in terms of the
power level and signal at which the protection is broken.
As for interception, security performance can be quantified
in terms of breaking the pseudo-random sequence spreading
the signal. However, novel attacks and computing power
evolution could end up breaking their computationally strong
security.
In this paper we introduce the information-theoretic approach
to the design of keyless physical layer security for space links.
This method exploits physical characteristics of the com-
munication channel and can numerically quantify secrecy
according to information-theoretic principles. This allows
the design of cryptographic coding schemes that can lead
to practical schemes adapted to channel, system and mission
specific constraints and design goals. The first study on the
applicability of information-theoretic physical layer security
to space links was [1] where it is proposed joint power and
multi beam antenna weights optimisation to meet individual
secrecy rate constraints. This work as well as subsequent
works [2] apply signal processing techniques rather than
wiretap coding and their focus is weak secrecy level. In
this paper we take a step forward focusing on evaluating the
potential of one-way keyless information theoretic wiretap
coding. Th e aim is to provide both reliability and crypto-
graphic semantic security.
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The main contributions of this positioning paper are three.
First, we clarify in Section II the information-theoretic frame-
work of physical layer security based on wiretap coding. We
describe the original wiretap channel and its generalisation
to include cryptographic semantic level of security. Second,
we introduce the general construction of wiretap codes to
realise physical layer security as well as a randomised hash
function construction, for which we show theoretical perfor-
mance. Finally, we illustrate the realistic potential of wiretap
coding for satellite channels through analysis and simulations
that provide quantitative results of secrecy performance over
existing satellite systems. We also identify system design im-
plications for possible simultaneous operation with additional
information theoretic security mechanisms.
2. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL AND SECURITY
CRITERIA
The wiretap channel
Information-theoretic security can be traced back to Shannon,
who introduced the classic model of a cryptosystem in 1949,
where Eve has access to an identical copy of the cyphertext
that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon defined perfect secrecy
to be the case when the plaintext and the cyphertext are
statistically independent. Perfect secrecy is motivated by
error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share
a secret key.
A. Wyner in 1975 [6] relaxes the stringent condition of perfect
statistical independency of Shannon’s cryptosystem and in-
troduced the wiretap channel model. In this model, transmis-
sion is not error-free. The wiretap channel model is composed
of two channels. One is the channel from the legitimate
transmitter (Alice) to the legitimate receiver (Bob), which
is referred to as the “main” channel, and is considered to
be a memoryless channel characterized by input alphabet X ,
output alphabet Y , a transition probability WY |X . The other
is the channel from Alice to a passive adversary (Eve), which
is referred to as the “eavesdropper’s channel”, and consists of
another memoryless channel characterized by input alphabet
X , output alphabet Z , and transition probability WZ|X . This
model supposes that the statistics of both channels are known
to all parties, and that authentication is already done2. Also, it
is assumed that Eve knows the coding scheme used by Alice
and Bob.
The channel can be probabilistic or combinatorial. The prob-
abilistic channel (known as Type I) is given in terms of the
transition probabilities WY |X and WZ|X . The combinatorial
channel (known as Type II) is given as an adversarial channel
model, where the intruder is allowed to observe µ ≤ N
components of XN . In either case, wiretap code design goal
is the simultaneous provision of reliability and security.
In [6] Wyner considered the special case where both the
main and the eavesdropper channel are discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs). Further, under the assumption that the
eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the main
channel, he defined and obtained a unique parameter char-
acterising the wiretap system, the secrecy capacity. This
parameter means that for  > 0, there exist coding schemes
that can provide secure and reliable rate (secrecy rate) Rs >
Cs − . Wyner proved that Alice can send information to
2A small secret key is needed to authenticate the communication. It is known
that logn bits of secret are sufficient to authenticate n bits of data [3]
Bob in perfect secrecy over a noisy channel without sharing
a secret key with Bob initially.
Wyner’s original wiretap channel model was generalised by
I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, in 1978 [8] who considered the
information-theoretic discrete memoryless broadcast chan-
nel. The noisy broadcast channel is characterised by the
conditional distribution WY Z|X so that Wyner’s model cor-
responds to the special case where V → X → Y Z is
a Markov chain and PY Z|X factors as WY |XWZ|X . The
secrecy capacity Cs(WY Z|X) is the maximal rate at which
Alice can reliably send information to Bob such that the rate
at which Eve obtains this information is arbitrarily small.
The secrecy capacity is positive whenever the legitimate
channel has an advantage in terms of the broadcast channel’s
conditional distribution WY Z|X .
The framework was later generalised to meet cryptographic
symmetry-breaking methods by [12] and [14]. The crypto-
graphic generalisation identifies the logical equivalence be-
tween some cryptographic and information theoretic security
metrics while introduces additional ones not used in Wyner’s
model. This cryptographic treatment of the wiretap channel
induces fundamental differences in terms of design goals
of the resulting cryptographic wiretap system. First, the
provision of security can be decoupled from the design of
codes for reliability. Second, the system departs from the
one-way Shannon transmission system model and enables
implementing different security protocols.
The cryptographic view of the wiretap channel can also be
framed within spectrum information-theoretic methods, as
established by Hayashi [24]. This framework provides a
methodology for the design of wiretap codes based on the
notion of channel resolvability.
Security metrics and wiretap coding design goals
Different security metrics correspond to different wiretap
code design goals. It would seem natural to relate the secrecy
of the message M ∈Mn to the probability of decoding error
from the observation Zn [4], [5]. However, error probability
depends on a distance metric between M and Zn while the
desired security metric is related to the information content in
Zn. We provide below security metrics in increasing strength
order and the corresponding design criteria of wiretap codes.
Weak secrecy. This criterion was introduced by Wyner [6]
and can be given by the normalized mutual information rate
Sweak(M ;Zn) =
1
n
I(M ;Zn) =
1
n
D(pMZn‖pMpZn), (1)
where D is the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
A wiretap code under this security metric should simultane-
ously provide reliability and security.
• Reliability condition: lim
n→∞P
(
Mˆ 6=M
)
= 0.
• Security condition: lim
n→∞Sweak(M ;Z
n) = 0.
Note that in this case wiretap code design follows classic
coding theory. For the probabilistic Type I wiretap channel,
the secrecy rate at which Alice and Bob can reliably and se-
curely communicate will tend, with increasing block length,
to the maximum possible value given by the secrecy capacity.
The results with weak security were extended to the Gaussian
channels in [9].
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For the combinatorial Type II wiretap channel, codes are de-
signed to provide perfect secrecy in terms of known algebraic
properties over hamming spaces. There are known secrecy
capacity-achieving constructions under this security metric
based on low density parity (LDPC) codes [26] and polar
codes [25].
This security metric was strengthened as follows.
Strong secrecy. The weak security metric criterion was
strengthened from a security point of view by subsequent
improvement of Wyner’s model [13] and consists in char-
acterizing the total information leakage
Sstrong(M ;Zn) = I(M ;Zn) = D(pMZn‖pMpZn). (2)
A wiretap code under this security metric should simultane-
ously provide reliability and security and was given in [23],
[24].
• Reliability condition: lim
n→∞P
(
Mˆ 6=M
)
= 0.
• Security condition: lim
n→∞Sstrong(M ;Z
n) = 0.
Note that wiretap code design for both weak and strong
secrecy is according to classic coding theory. Specifically, for
fixed rate, a wiretap coding scheme (encoding and decoding
algorithms) is a family of increasing block length codes that
provide either weak or strong security conditions. For the
Gaussian channels, a wiretap code under this security metric
was given in [17, Appendix D-C] When we use LDPC codes,
the security under this security metric was shown only for the
binary erasure wiretap channel [28], Also, there are known
secrecy capacity-achieving constructions under this security
metric based on polar codes [27].
Semantic secrecy. This information theoretic secrecy crite-
rion was formalized by Bellare, Tessaro, and Vardy [14], [15]
by adapting the notion of semantic secrecy used in compu-
tational cryptography [16]. In this setting, classic coding
theoretic design and terminology is replaced by cryptographic
methods and terminology. In this setting, a wiretap coding
scheme is generalised to an encryption scheme, a family of
encryption functions (encryption and decryption algorithms).
Semantic secrecy generalises the previous secrecies, which
are included under particular conditions. This is achieved
by introducing a fundamental difference on how to measure
secrecy, which is now measured in terms of indistinguisha-
bility. In addition, the design conditions of semantic secrecy
systems are independent of the receiver channel. Further, the
semantic security metric is measured in terms of a quantita-
tive real number, the advantage Adv(M ;Zn), defined as
Adv(M ;Zn)
=max
f,pM
(∑
zn
pZn(z
n) max
fi∈supp(f)
P (f(M) = fi|zn)
− max
fi∈supp(f)
P (f(M) = fi)
)
. (3)
where f is an additional channel with domain the message
set that represents partial information about the message.
Accordingly, the following distinction is in place [14]:
• Qualitative secrecy condition: This condition establishes
only asymptotically whether or not a encryption scheme is
secure. It is defined as lim
n→∞Adv(M ;Z
n) = 0. However, this
does not mandate any particular rate at which the advantage
should vanish.
• Quantitative secrecy condition: This condition es-
tablishes a numerical secrecy metric as measured by
Adv(M ;Zn).
Essentially, Adv(M ;Zn) <  means that the knowledge of
the observation Zn increases the probability of guessing any
function f of the message M by no more than , irrespective
of its distribution pM . For example, an encryption function is
said to achieve s-bit semantic security if Adv(M ;Zn) < 2−s.
Under such distinction, it is possible to establish conditions
for the logical equivalence between semantic and strong
secrecy. In particular, semantic secrecy can be guaran-
teed by upper bounding the quantity maxpM Sstrong(M ;Z
n)
with a proper coefficient. Since the security criterion
maxpM Sstrong(M ;Z
n) expresses the strong security indepen-
dent of the source distribution PM , it is called the source
universal security [17, Section XIII].
Security analysis
The above criteria and conditions serve as design goals of
wiretap codes that can provide required levels of reliability
and security to a communication system or service.
The security analysis of specific designs of wiretap codes
needs to comply with the wiretap coding assumptions of
operation, which are
(1) communication is one-way,
(2) the adversary is computationally unbounded,
(3) the security scheme is keyless,
(4) the channel of the adversary is noisier than the legitimate
channel.
Note that condition (3) assumes that sender and receiver do
not share a priori any information not known to the adversary.
Also note that (4) depends on the wiretap system model.
In the remainder of the paper, an (n, k, , δ) code refers to a
code for the wiretap channel that transmits one of 2k distinct
messages over n uses of the channel, ensures an average
probability of error less than , and guarantees a secrecy
leakage measured in terms of Sstrong or Adv less than δ. The
quantity k/n is the rate of the code.
Most information-theoretic studies of the wiretap channel
focus on characterizing the secrecy capacity Cs, which is the
maximum of the transmission rate k/n with arbitrarily low
probability of error and secrecy leakage in the limit n→∞.
Formally, Cs is the supremum of all rates R, such that there
exists sequences of (n, kn, n, δn) codes with
lim
n→∞
kn
n
≥ R, lim
n→∞ n = limn→∞ δn = 0.
The secrecy capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap chan-
nel is completely characterized for the weak secrecy, strong
secrecy, and semantic secrecy metrics, as [8]
Cs = max
pVX
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z))+ , (4)
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where I(V ;Y ) and I(V ;Z) express the mutual informations
under the distributions pV XY := WY |XpXV and pV XZ :=
WZ|XpXV , and (a)+ is a for a positive number a and is 0 for
a negative number a.
In particular, Cs is positive when the eavesdropper’s channel
is not less noisy than the main channel [8], i.e., unless the
inequality I(V ;Z) ≥ I(V ;Y ) holds for any joint distribution
pV X .
Such characterization of the Cs and corresponding achiev-
ability corresponds to qualitative secrecy conditions. The
analysis of quantitative secrecy conditions, corresponds to
the case where the wiretap codeword length, n, is just large
enough to achieve a given target reliability. For this reason
it is denoted as analysis in the finite-length regime. The
intuition for this regime is that the codeword length is large
enough to achieve a target reliability and/or secrecy perfor-
mance. In this case the communication system will not be
able to filter out the stochastic variability introduced by the
actual channel. The secrecy analysis in the finite-length
regime boils down to characterize the number of semantic
bits that can be transmitted. This number will provide
intuition on the relations and tradeoffs between system design
performance targets and achievable secrecy.
3. GENERAL WIRETAP CODE CONSTRUCTION
Now, we discuss how to make a wire-tap channel code to
realize the security. First, we prepare an auxiliary random
variable Ln subject to the uniform distribution on another setLn. Then, we prepare an error correcting code. That is, we
prepare an encoder as a map φe,n from the setMn × Ln to
the input alphabet Xn, and a decoder as a map φd,n from the
input alphabet Xn to the setMn × Ln.
We also prepare another map fn from Mn × Ln to Mn
satisfying the condition
|f−1n (m)| = |Ln| (5)
for m ∈ Mn. This map is often called a hash function. The
encoder of our wire-tap code is given as follows. When Alice
intends to send a message m, using the auxiliary random
variable Ln, she generates a random variable L′n on f
−1
n (m)
because the cardinality of f−1n (m) is the same as that of Ln.
Then, she sends the alphabet φe,n(L′n). The decoder is given
as the map fn ◦ φd,n.
When X has a modular structure and the channels WY |X
and WZ|X satisfy covariant properties, the channel is called
symmetric. Now, we consider the special symmetric case
when X = {0, 1} = F2.
Now, we employ an algebraic error correcting code for the
case with X = F2. That is, the map φe,n is given as a
homomorphism from the setMn × Ln to the input alphabet
Xn = Fn2 , whereMn and Ln are given as Fkn2 and Fk
′
n
2 , and
the map fn fromMn×Ln toMn is given as an isomorphism.
Such an algebraic code is given as a pair of two sublinear
spaces C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , where C1 and C2 are isomorphic to
Fkn+k
′
n
2 and F
k′n
2 , respectively. So, the map φe,n is given as
the isomorphism from Fkn+k
′
n
2 to C1. Using the isomorphic
from the quotient space C1/C2 to Fkn2 , we define the map fn
fromMn × Ln toMn. This type of encoder is called coset
encoding.
4. RANDOMIZED HASH FUNCTION
In this section, we fix an algebraic error correcting code
(φe,n, φd,n). Here, we choose integers kn and k′n such that
kn + k
′
n is the message length of the given algebraic error
correcting code (φe,n, φd,n) and kn is the message length
of our secrecy transmission. So, k′n can be regarded as the
sacrifice bit-length in our protocol. Then, we consider a
randomized hash function F : Fkn+k
′
n
2 → Fkn2 satisfying the
following property:
∀m 6= ∀m′ ∈ Fkn+k′n2 P (F (m) = F (m′)) ≤
1
2kn
. (6)
This condition is called univeral2[3], [22], and will be sup-
posed in the remaining part. A modified form of the Toeplitz
matrices is also shown to be universal2, which is given by
a concatenation (T (S), I) of the k′n × kn Toeplitz matrix
T (S) and the kn × kn identity matrix I [18], where S is
the random seed to decide the Toeplitz matrix and belongs to
Fkn+k
′
n−1
2 . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly
useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multipli-
cation algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm
with complexity O(n log n).
When the random seed S is fixed, the encoder for
our wire-tap code is given as follows. By using
the auxiliary random variable Ln ∈ Fk
′
n
2 , the en-
coder is given as φe,n
((
I −T (S)
0 I
)(
M
Ln
))
because
(I, T (S))
(
I −T (S)
0 I
)
= (I, 0). (Toeplitz matrix T (S)
can be constructed as a part of circulant matrix. For example,
the reference [19, Appedix C] gives a method to give a
circulant matrix.). More efficient construction for univeral2
hash function is discussed in [19].
So, the decoder is given as Y n 7→ (I, T (S))φd,n(Y n). When
φd,n can be efficiently performed like a LDPC code or a
Polar code, That is, as long as the algebraic error correcting
code (φe,n, φd,n) can be efficiently performed our code can
be efficiently performed.
Using the channel to eavesdropper described by a transition
matrix WZ|X , we define the function
ψ(s|WZ|X , qX)
:= log
∑
x,z
qX(x)WZ|X(z|x)1+s(
∑
x
qX(x)WZ|X(z|x))−s.
(7)
This function satisfies
ψ(s|WZ|X , qX)
s
→ I(X;Z) (8)
as s→ 0.
Firstly, for simplicity, we consider the case when the main
channel WY |X is noiseless and the channel to the eaves
dropper is given as the n-fold extension of WZ|X . In this
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case, the error correcting encoder φe,n is the identity map and
kn + k
′
n = n. So, as a special case of [18, (12)], the above
given code satisfies
EF esSstrong(M ;Z
n) ≤ 1 + 2−sk′nenψ(s|WZ|X ,qX) (9)
for s ∈ [0, 1]. Jensen inequality yields that
EFSstrong(Mn;Zn) ≤1
s
log(1 + 2−sk
′
nenψ(s|WZ|X ,qX))
≤1
s
2−sk
′
nenψ(s|WZ|X ,qX) (10)
for s ∈ [0, 1]. So, when ψ(s|WZ|X ,qX)s is smaller
than knn log 2, the average of the leaked information
EFSstrong(Mn;Zn) goes to zero exponentially.
Now, we proceed to the general case, i.e., the case when the
main channelWY |X is noisy. So, the error correcting encoder
φe,n is not the identity map, and kn + k′n is smaller than n.
To discuss the general case, we introduce other functions
E0(s|WZ|X , qX) := log
∑
z
(
∑
x
qX(x)WZ|X(z|x)
1
1−s )1−s
(11)
E0,max(s|WZ|X) :=max
qX
E0(s|WZ|X , qX). (12)
This function satisfies
E0(s|WZ|X , qX)
s
→ I(X;Z) (13)
as s → 0. When WZ|X is symmetric, E0,max(s|WZ|X)
equals E0(s|WZ|X , qX) with uniform distribution qX for X .
The above given code [18, Lemma 1, Theorem 4, (16)]
satisfies
EFSstrong(M ;Zn) ≤ 1
s
2−sk
′
nenE0,max(s|WZ|X). (14)
for s ∈ [0, 1]. So, when E0,max(s|WZ|X)s is smaller
than (k
′
n
n ) log 2, the average of the leaked information
EFSstrong(M ;Zn) goes to zero exponentially.
Since this method can be applied to any algebraic error
correcting code, our method can be applied to the case when
the code (φe,n, φd,n) is a LDPC code or a Polar code. So, our
method provides an efficient wire-tap code based on LDPC
codes and Polar codes, which attains the wire-tap capacity for
symmetric channel because the maximum in (4) is attained
when PX is the uniform distribution.
Note that these inequalities still hold even for any input
distribution forM and any asymmetric channelWZ|X . When
WZ|X is symmetric. Sstrong(M ;Zn) with a general input
distribution for M is upper bounded by that with the uniform
distribution for M . So, we can guarantee the semantic
secrecy. In this case, qX is also chosen to be the uniform
distribution for X . However, when WZ|X is asymmetric,
we need to expurgate the messages to guarantee the semantic
secrecy. This process requires large calculation complexity.
Further, even when the auxiliary random number Ln is not
uniform, a similar evaluation is available by slightly dif-
ferent coding given in [17, Section XI]. Then, the above
security evaluation holds with the replacement of 2−sk
′
n by
esH1+s(Ln), where H1+s(X) is the Re´nyi entropy defined as
H1+s(X) := −1
s
log
∑
x
PX(x)
1+s. (15)
These evaluations still hold even when the output system of
WZ|X is continuous, e.g., the AWGN channel [17, Appendix
D]. In particular, the AWGN channel with binary input can
be regarded as a symmetric channel.
5. SATELLITE WIRETAP CHANNEL MODEL
Our general construction assumes n satellite channel uses.
We analyse the wiretap secrecy of a typical satellite chan-
nel with 2m-level phase shift keying (2m-PSK) modulation
with additive white Gaussian (AWGN) noise, which can be
unfaded or faded.
Transmitted signal model
The bandpass i-th 2m-PSK signal, for i = 1, . . . , 2m, can be
mathematically represented as
xBPi (t) =
√
2PRe
{
xLPi (t) e
j2fcpit
}
,
where xBPi (t) is the continuous complex low pass equiva-
lent signal (or complex envelope) that conveys the complex
information symbol,
xLPi (t) =
[
XRei + jX
Im
i
]
p (t) = Xip(t),
which for 2m-PSK is given as
Xi = exp
[
j
2pi (i− 1)
2m
]
, i = 1, . . . , 2m .
The signal p(t) is the shaping pulse of duration equal to
the symbol duration, Ts. The factor
√
2P represents the
peak value of the sinusoidal carrier with power dissipated
P (over unitary load). Note that we choose the complex
baseband signal representation to be normalized with EX =
E
[
|Xi|2
]
= 1.
Geometrical representation in the signal space is useful for
secrecy analysis. For example, for m = 1 we have the binary
signal called BPSK. Assuming b(t) takes the value +1 when
binary ”1” is to be transmitted and the value -1 when binary
”0” is to be transmitted, we can represent the BPSK signal as
two points located on a single orthonormal carrier
xBPSK (t) = b (t)
√
Ebφ (t) ,
with one point located at +
√
Eb and another point located
at −√Eb with Eb = PTb, Tb is the bit period and the
orthonormal carrier is
φ (t) =
√
2/Tbcos (2fcpit) .
This signal space view considers the set of waveforms as the
vector space of finite-energy complex functions, the (infinite-
dimensional) Hilbert space, L2. Hence, this view is related
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to the (continuous) transmission domain (e.g time). Alter-
natively, the signal space view representing the complex low
pass equivalent signal is convenient for analysis of geomet-
rical properties of the (digital) information. In this case, the
transmission domain can be abstracted away.
Large-scale model
It is convenient to characterise the received signal model in
terms of large-scale and short/medium-scale signal variations
for both Bob and Eve.
For the large-scale, the low pass complex statistical signal
models of the received signals after demodulation during a
symbol interval are
Y l = hlY (piB , λc)X +NB
Zl = hlZ (piE , λc)X +NE ,
(16)
where X is the complex transmitted symbol. hlY (piY , λc)
and hlZ (piY , λc) are deterministic coefficients that describe
the (square root of) the power decay due to propagation.
piB = (ρB , θB) and piE = (ρE , θE) describe Bob’s and
Eve’s polar coordinates (with Alice’s location as reference
of coordinate system), where ρB is the distance from Alice
to Bob and θB = 0. λc is the transmission wavelength, i.e.
λc = c/fc with c the speed of light.
The dependency of the propagation attenuation with the
wavelength is only due to how the system parameters are
measured for computing the free loss propagation. The co-
efficients NB and NE are complex circular Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and spectral density nB and nE ,
respectively.
For the purpose of the security analysis to be made here,
without loss of generality, it is sufficient to consider a simpli-
fied e.g. uplink budget between Alice and Bob that captures
the wiretap large-scale system geometry. In this case, the
deterministic coefficient for Bob can be expressed as
hlY (piB , λ) =
√
gA,maxgB,max
1
ρB
(
λc
4pi
)
, (17)
where gA,max and gB,max are the gains of Alice’s antenna
and Bob’s antennas to each other direction. We assume
perfect polarization antenna matching and we omit additional
transmission/reception path losses and (geo-climatic) atmo-
spheric contributions as a first approximation. For reliable
communication, the satellite system design should ensure a
minimal received power level at the legitimate receiver so that
the link budget is closed.
Now denote the distance between Alice and Eve as ρE and the
angle in degrees from the maximum directivity direction from
Alice’s antenna to Eve as θE . Let’s introduce the parameter
α (θE) to account for spatial attenuation due to Alice’s an-
tenna radiation’s pattern with respect to the Bob’s boresight
angle. α (θE) is known because emission of radiation in
space communication is regulated. Let’s also introduce the
parameter µ (θE) to account for the relative antenna gain
between Bob and Eve, i.e.
√
gE (θE) = µ (θE)
√
gB,max.
with µ taking values between 0 and 1. Finally, we define
β (r, ρE) to account for relative propagation losses between
Bob and Eve as
β2 (r, ρE) =
ρ2B
ρrE
. (18)
The exponent r accounts for the power attenuation decay that
affects Eve’s propagation channel. Different values of the
exponent model correspond to different assumptions about
Eve. For example, Eve can be modelled as a terrestrial, aerial
or satellite station. For example, while for the satellite case
r = 2, in case of aerial Eve, a good assumption is to consider
a large scale two-ray ground multipath model, with r > 2.
We can then write
hlZ (piE , λ) = h
l
Y (piB , λ)α (θE)µ (θE)β (r, ρE) . (19)
Medium/short-scale model
For the medium/short-scale, the received signals after demod-
ulation for a symbol interval are
Y = hY (piB , λc)X +NB
Z = hZ (piE , λc)X +NE ,
(20)
where hB (piB , λc) and hE (piE , λc) are now random
variables that describe the medium/short term variations
normalised with respect to the deterministic coefficients
hlB (piB , λc) and h
l
E (piE , λc), respectively. The first-order
statistical characterisation of these random variables for Bob
highly depends on the frequency and the satellite mission.
For Eve, it depends on the type of the relative location and
whether or not transmission is affected by atmospheric losses
(e.g. Eve is below/above the clouds). Both for Bob and
Eve, for the cases when there is fading due to multipath
propagation (short-scale channel dynamics), it is usually
modelled separated from shadow fluctuations (medium-scale
channel dynamics). The second-order statistical characterisa-
tion mostly depends on the relative speeds.
Comparison with spread spectrum signal model
It is clarifying to identify here the difference between the
signal model for physical layer security based on spread
spectrum and on wiretap coding. In order to see this, note
that the data signal stochastic process generated by Alice is
aLP (t) =
∑
j
aLPj (t) =
∑
j
Xjp (t− jTs) ,
whereXj are random variables taking 2m-PSK values. When
spread spectrum techniques are used, the data signal is further
modulated using a pseudo-random or cryptographic pseudo-
random sequence cPN (t) either using frequency hopping or
direct multiplication. In the latter case the data signal is
aSS (t) = aLP (t) cPN (t), (21)
with
cPN (t) =
∑
k
Ckg
(
t− kTc
Tc
)
, (22)
where g(t) is the chip waveform assuming support limited
to one chip interval. The chip duration, Tc, is assumed as
Tc = Ts/G, with G the number of chips per symbol interval.
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From the signal model we can see that physical layer security
based on spread spectrum operates at waveform level. The
“plaintext” is the information signal (here represented in
complex lowpass equivalent form), which is encrypted into
a noise-like waveform using a (possibly crypto) pseudo-
random sequence. Differently, the information-theoretic
physical layer security discussed here operates at information
signal level. Now, the “plaintext” is the kn-length information
message that Alice wants to transmit to Bob. Both security
mechanisms could in principle operate jointly. However, we
do not discuss such possible joint design here.
Satellite Gaussian channel model
A simple but relevant satellite channel is the Gaussian chan-
nel, i.e. we assume the channel has no fading
hY (piB , λc) = 1. (23)
In the following, we assume some fixed frequency so we
can drop the dependency of the wavelength. Assuming the
deterministic channel coefficient known to transmitter and
legitimate and illegitimate receivers, the short/medium term
signal model of the Gaussian wiretap satellite channel is
Y = X +NB
Z = γgX +NE ,
(24)
where the deterministic coefficient γg is defined as
γg := α (θE)µ (θE)β (r, ρE) . (25)
We can re-write the model so that Bob’s signal is the refer-
ence for Eve’s signal
Y = X +
√
nBX1
Z = γgX +
√
γnnBX1,
(26)
where the coefficient γn taking values between 0 and 1. This
coefficient accounts for the relative performance of Eve’s
w.r.t. Bob’s receivers in terms of Gaussian noise power. X1 is
a zero-mean circular complex Gaussian random variable with
unit variance.
From the resulting Gaussian wiretap signal model we can see
that the degradation of Eve’s channel with respect to Bob’s
channel is driven by two components of the wiretap system:
• Geometrical properties. The geometry of the large-scale
wiretap satellite scenario introduces degradation due to the
relative attenuation in Eve’s channel with respect to Bob’s
channel. This degradation is captured by β (r, ρE),
• System parameters. These include Eve’s receiver antenna
gain relative to Bob’s, which is captured by µ (θE), Alice’s
transmitter antenna gain relative to Eve’s, captured by θ (θE)
and the relative receivers performance, captured by γn.
In particular we see that Eve’s signal amplitude is degraded
w.r.t. Bob’s if γg < 1. We also see that Gaussian variability is
bigger for Eve’s signal whenever γn > 1. Consequently, the
geometrical influence in the signal amplitude could compen-
sate for the effect of Eve’s system parameters. In particular,
Eve could have stronger signal than Bob if
α (θE)µ (θE) > 1/β (r, ρE) . (27)
In order to gain further insight, assume that the power de-
cay represented by the parameter α(θE) is exponential as
α(θE) = 1/θ
a. According to (26) and assuming equally
good antennas for Bob and Eve, the angular spatial condition
for having Eve’s signal amplitude below Bob’s as a function
of distance proximity is
θE >
(
ρB/ρ
r/2
E
)a/2
.
Figure 1. Illustration of Eve’s closest angular distance to
Alice (as a function of relative distances) so Eve’s signal
amplitude is γg < 1.
It is observed that for equal (free space) propagation condi-
tions for Bob and Eve, the angular proximity does not depend
on the absolute distances. This means that the same condition
holds for any type of satellite orbit. This fact is illustrated
in Figure 1, where for r = 2 the same minimum angular
proximity holds for the three considered types of satellite. It
is also shown how angular proximity depends on the type of
orbit whenever Eve’s propagation conditions are worse than
Bob’s. In such case, Eve must be closer to the satellite link.
Figure 2 illustrates two numerical examples on the amount of
energy that can be captured by Eve as given by γg . It shows
the case where both Bob and Eve have equal (free space)
propagation law. It can be seen that when Eve is closer to
Alice than Bob both in distance and in angle (represented by
small ρE/ρB and small θE , respectively) the quality of Eve’s
channel is always better (i.e. γg > 1). However, usually
the proximity of satellite stations more prone to wire-tapping
(e.g. a space data link) is in general protected as an asset and
Eve will not be able to get too close. The upper surface in
the figure shows a situation beneficial for Eve due to advan-
tageous transmitter and receiving antenna patterns, showing
the significant influence of diagram antenna patters.The lower
surface shows the corresponding disadvantageous situation
for Eve only to due to disadvantageous transmitter and re-
ceiving antenna patterns. It can be seen that in th is case Eve
needs to be extremely close to Alice for γg > 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a propagation law for Eve of
r = 2.2 assuming LEO orbit. As expected, it can be seen it
is less beneficial for Eve than the free-space propagation law.
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Figure 2. Illustration of the influence of wiretap system
parameters on Eve’s amplitude signal degradation for
different values of system parameters.
Figure 3. Illustration of the influence of wiretap channel
propagation on Eve’s amplitude signal degradation for
different propagation laws.
However, we also saw that Eve could compensate this effect
with an optimized choice of system parameters.
The above conditions are simplified as we have not taken
into account atmospheric losses and accurate propagation
law for Eve. This will depend on the aerial vehicle used
by Eve. However, it is clear that given concrete system
and propagation assumptions for Bob and Eve, it is possible
to compute with high accuracy the large scale geometrical
region where γg < 1 holds.
Figure 4. Secrecy capacity showing the effect of Eve’s
noise.
6. SECRECY ANALYSIS: INFINITE-LENGTH
REGIME
In this regime we use standard information theoretical termi-
nology and arguments. The secrecy metrics in this regime is
information-theoretic strong secrecy and the implied asymp-
totic semantic security.
To do the analysis, we first map our wiretap Gaussian satellite
channel model to the information-theoretic wiretap channel
model. The way to do it is to identify the satellite channel
with a two-user memoryless broadcast channel, with the
legitimate transmitter having input X and two receiver ob-
servations Y and Z, the legitimate and intruder respectively.
From the signal models, we can now identify the wiretap
communication channel, i.e. the statistical relation between
the transmitted signal and the received signal during n avail-
able channel uses. This channel is statistically described by
the conditional distribution WY Z|X . We saw that the secrecy
capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel is com-
pletely characterized for the weak secrecy, strong secrecy,
and semantic secrecy metrics, as (4). We also remember that
Bob’s and Eve’s observed signal are given in (26).
The independent Eve’s and Bob’s channels are dis-
crete input and continuous AWGN output channels.
The input random variable X takes vales in X :={
exp
[
j 2pi(i−1)2m
]
, i = 1, . . . , 2m
}
, which is called 2m-PSK
modulation.
According to our satellite channel model, we can express the
secrecy capacity as
Cs = max
qX
(I(Y ;X)− I(Z;X))+ , (28)
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Figure 5. Comparison of BI-AWGN Bob’s and Eve’s
capacities with known Gaussian and BSC capacities. Eve’s
capacity is shown for the case γg = 0.5
which depends on the constant coefficients γg , and γn intro-
duced in Section 5, which represent the degradation of Eve’s
signal amplitude and noise power w.r.t. Bob’s, respectively.
The mutual information for Bob’s channel is
I(Y ;X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈X
WY |X (y|x) qX (x) log2
WY |X (y|x)
WY (y)
dy
where
WY (y) :=
∑
x
WY |X (y|x) qX (x) .
The mutual information for Eve’s channel is
I(Z;X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈X
WZ|X(z|x)qX(x) log2
WZ|X(z|x)
WZ(z)
dz
where
WZ(z) :=
∑
x
WZ|X(z|x)qX(x).
In this case, the maximization in (28) is achieved by the
uniform distribution due to the symmetry. In general, the
bit error probability of 2m-PSK is difficult to obtain for an
arbitrary integer m. We assume from now m = 1 so that X
takes values in {−1, 1}, which is called BPSK modulation.
The secrecy capacity for BPSK input corresponds to the
Figure 6. Mixed Gaussian probability density functions at
Bob’s detection.
positive values of
Cs =
1
2
∫
WY |X (y|1) log2
WY |X (y|1)
WY (y)
dy
+
1
2
∫
WY |X (y| − 1) log2
WY |X (y| − 1)
WY (y)
dy
− 1
2
∫
WZ|X (z|1) log2
WZ|X (z|1)
WZ (z)
dz
− 1
2
∫
WZ|X (z| − 1) log2
WZ|X (z| − 1)
WZ (z)
dz.
We assume that3 nB = σ2B = N0. The conditional
probabilities for Bob’s observation are
WY |X (y|1) = 1√
2piN0
e−
(y−1)2
2N0 ,
WY |X (y| − 1) = 1√
2piN0
e−
(y+1)2
2N0 ,
while the conditional probabilities for Eve’s observation are
WZ|X (z|1) = 1√
2piγnN0
e−
(z−γg)2
2γnN0 ,
WZ|X (z| − 1) = 1√
2piγnN0
e−
(z+γg)2
2γnN0 .
This secrecy capacity is asymptotically achievable by the
wiretap code given in Section 4. The calculation of this
capacity can be computed numerically in Figure 4.
3Usually for a bandpass 2m-PSK the assumption is σ2B = N0/2. However,
since we focus on a BPSK signal it is coherent to assume instead σ2B = N0
as the two BPSK symbols are real.
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Figure 7. Mixed Gaussian probability density functions at
Eve’s detection for the case γg = 0.5.
To see the detail structure of the secrecy capacity, we calcu-
late Bob’s and Eve’s capacities
CB =
1
2
∫
WY |X (y|1) log2
WY |X (y|1)
WY (y)
dy
+
1
2
∫
WY |X (y| − 1) log2
WY |X (y| − 1)
WY (y)
dy
CE =
1
2
∫
WZ|X (z|1) log2
WZ|X (z|1)
WZ (z)
dz
+
1
2
∫
WZ|X (z| − 1) log2
WZ|X (z| − 1)
WZ (z)
dz
as Figure 5 when γg = 0.5. Here, we need to treat the mixed
Gaussian probability density functions WY (y) and WZ (z).
These probability density functions are illustrated in Figures
6 and 7.
This capacity is known as the capacity of the Binary-Input
AWGN (BI-AWGN) channel and is illustrated in Figure 5. It
is shown in comparison with the well known capacities of a
Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) and the Gaussian channel.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of channel degradation on the
mixed Gaussian pdfs for the case of γg = 0.5. It is observed
that Eve’s distinguishability of Gaussians drops w.r.t to Bob’s
due to channel degradation.
The positivity of the secrecy capacity can be analyzed as
follows. When the new random variable Z ′ := Z√γn , the
Figure 8. Visualization of the condition for positive
capacity.
conditional probabilities for Eve’s observation are
WZ′|X (z′|1) = 1√
2piN0
e−
(
z− γg√
γn
)2
2N0 ,
WZ′|X (z′| − 1) = 1√
2piN0
e−
(
z+
γg√
γn
)2
2N0 .
Comparing WY |X and WZ′|X , we find that CB > CE if and
only if
γg <
√
γn. (29)
because the channel WZ′|X is given as a degraded channel of
WY |X only in the case (29).
Now, we see this necessarily and sufficient condition from
the viewpoint of c-separation of a mixed Gaussian den-
sity function introduced in [34]. Two Gaussians N(ν1, σ2)
and N(ν2, σ2) are c-separated if ||ν1 − ν2|| ≥ cσ. In
particular a 2-separated mixture corresponds roughly to al-
most completely separated Gaussians. In our case, as-
suming a 2-separation condition for Eve’s mixed Gaussian
pmix (z|γg, γn), would correspond to Eve being able to dis-
tinguish between the two symbols. Hence, an approximate
condition of positive secrecy capacity is to assume Eve’s
mixed Gaussian to be less than 2-separated, which yields the
following condition
γg√
γn
<
√
N0
E0
.
The accuracy of this condition is illustrated in Figure 8. It
shows the case of E0 = N0 = 1, in which case the condition
for positive capacity is (29).
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7. SECURITY ANALYSIS: FINITE-LENGTH
REGIME
The wiretap code must provide reliable communication with
secrecy guarantees to a specific system or service operating
in the finite-length regime. In the following, we restrict
our error correction and the hash functions to linear opera-
tions. In this case maxpM Sstrong(M ;Z
n) is realized when
pM is the uniform distribution because our wiretap satellite
WZ|X (z|x) is symmetric. So, we simply denote this leaked
information with the uniform distribution by Sstrong(M ;Zn)
Since maxpM Sstrong(M ;Z
n) upper bounds the semantic se-
crecy with a proper coefficient, we adopt Sstrong(M ;Zn) as
our secrecy metric in this regime. Since our wiretap satellite
WZ|X (z|x) is symmetric, its upper bound given in (14) is
given as the case when qX is the uniform distribution. So, due
to the symmetric property, the asymptotically attainability of
the secrecy capacity also entails semantic secrecy attainabil-
ity.
As an evaluation of the leaked information, we find that the
average of the leaked information for our wiretap satellite
channel is bounded as
EFSstrong(M ;Zn) ≤Sstrong(s|M ;Zn)
:=
1
s
2−sk
′
nenE0,max(s|WZ|X) (30)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where F is the hash function whose distribution
is given in Section 4, and
E0,max(s|WZ|X) = log
∫
(
∑
x∈{1,−1}
1
2
WZ|X(z|x)
1
1−s )1−sdz.
In order to make explicit the dependency on the geometry and
system parameters we express the exponent as
E0,max(s|WZ|X)
= log
∫ (
1
2
([
1√
2piN0
e−
(z−γg)2
2γnN0
] 1
1−s
+
[
1√
2piN0
e−
(z+γg)2
2γnN0
] 1
1−s
))1−s
dz.
The average of the leaked information EFSstrong goes to zero
exponentially when E0,max(s|WZ|X)s is smaller than (
k′n
n ) log 2
with a real number s ∈ (0, 1]. This implies that when we ran-
domly choose F , the quantity Sstrong(M ;Zn) is sufficiently
small with high probability.
For the finite-length numerical analysis, we make use of the
range of values obtained in the infinite-length analysis for
which the capacity is positive. For example, we can anal-
yse operational points such that
(
γg, γn > γ
2
g
)
. For easier
visualization we choose E0 = N0 = 1.
Figure 9 shows the function E0,max(s|WZ|X) illustrating the
effect of the noise at Eve’s receiver for two operational points
of positive capacity with E0 = N0 = 1. We can see that
larger γg leads to a bigger value of the exponent. Hence,
Eve’s leakage will consume more air time for security out of
the overall budget of airtime for information and redundancy
for reliability.
Figure 9. Effect of the noise at Eve’s receiver in the
function E0,max(s|WZ|X) for γg = 0.6 (top) and γg = 0.3
(down), where E0 = N0 = 1.
Now we analyse the performance that our wiretap code can
provide in order to guarantee design target levels of simulta-
neous secrecy and reliability to a space channel.
We analyse two different space systems. First we assume
a commercial satellite system using DVB-S2X air interface
with quasi-error free goal. The theoretical satellite broadcast
channel model BI-AWGN can be mapped to a typical DVB-
S2X channel when using BPSK modulation and a LDPC
code with medium coding block length of n = 32400
and coding rates of 1/5, 11/45, 1/3. Adaptive coding and
modulation would require secrecy rate to adapt accordingly.
A typical scenario in this case would be a broadcasting
service over GEO satellite. Second, we assume the European
Space Agency scientific mission called Euclid, planned to
be launched in 2020 to map the geometry of the dark Uni-
verse. The scenario is very different since large quantity of
scientific data will be transmitted through bandwidth-limited
links with very long propagation delay. The CCSDS code
LDPC AR4JA (8192, 4096) is foreseen for the K-band link
(bit rate 73.84638 Mb/s), with a FER lower than 10−5. Note
that mission-specific services may prioritize reliability over
secrecy or vice versa for the specific air interface. The
secrecy analysis can be performed just considering the LDPC
coding rate for each of the systems and analysing the trade
off between reliability and security.
Let’s denote the wiretap coding rate as ρsec = k′n/n
and consider the LDPC coding rates for the above sys-
tems. Then, the coding rate budget available for infor-
mation is limited by the wiretap coding rate that is set
as design target. Figure 10 illustrates the performance
for DVB-S2X for different wiretap coding rates when the
wiretap system operates at
(
γg,
√
γn
)
=
(
0.3,
√
2
)
and(
γg,
√
γn
)
=
(
0.5,
√
2
)
. The graphs show the minimum
upper bound mins∈[0,1] log2 Sstrong(s|M ;Zn) as a function
of ρsec. The two examples are valid operation points
that guarantee positive secrecy rate since in both cases we
have the condition (29). Now, if by design we assign
10% of overall bit transmission budget for wiretap coding
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Figure 10. Secrecy performance at operative points(
γg,
√
γn
)
=
(
0.3,
√
2
)
(blue) and
(
γg,
√
γn
)
=
(
0.5,
√
2
)
(red) for the DVB-S2X system. The bottom figure is a zoom
in for small wiretap coding rate.
rate, the obtained secure coding rate has a guaranteed se-
crecy quantified as mins∈[0,1] log2 Sstrong(s|M ;Zn) = −200
for the case of Eve being further away from Eve and
mins∈[0,1] log2 Sstrong(s|M ;Zn) = −50 when Eve is closer.
We see that secrecy is consumed by the effect of the geometry
represented by γg . From another perspective, provision of
secrecy is an interplay between geometry and energy in the
same way as provision of reliability. Figure 11 illustrates
the performance for the Euclid system for different wiretap
coding rates. Due to the characteristics of the system, now
we observe the effect of different receiver performance at the
eavesdropper. In this case we see that secrecy is consumed
when Eve’s has a better receiver than the legitimate receiver
with respect to the case of equally performing receivers.
In both cases, it is clear that a design target of higher level of
secrecy requires a higher amount of reliability redundancy to
be sacrificed for secrecy. Hence, for any capacity achieving
channel code that is in use today, it is possible to use a wiretap
code on top of the channel code. The tradeoff between
guaranteed secrecy and overhead is equivalent to the tradeoff
between guaranteed reliability and overhead. The difference
now is that the secrecy overhead reduces the communication
rate, which becomes the secrecy rate upper bounded by the
secrecy capacity. However, the obtained reliable transmission
can be guaranteed to be unconditionally secure for the geom-
etry and system conditions that have been shown in Section
5.
Note that for certain mission-specific air interfaces, the finite-
length regime needs to be analyzed considering both the link
and the physical layer framing. This is due to the fact that
some air interface may define very short link layer frames
and/or significant physical layer overhead. In such cases,
the air interface overhead could be comparable to the coding
overhead.
Figure 11. Secrecy performance at operative points(
γg,
√
γn
)
= (0.3, 1) (red) and
(
γg,
√
γn
)
=
(
0.3,
√
2
)
(blue) for the Euclid system.The bottom figure is a zoom in
for small wiretap coding rate.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have derived a realistic satellite wiretap
channel model that we have mapped to information-theoretic
wiretap models. The models allow to show that wiretap
coding alone can protect from passive eavesdropping the
channel-degraded areas of a (broadcasting in nature) satellite
channel. The size of such protected areas can be evaluated
and depends on the large-scale geometry of the satellite link
and on system-dependent parameters such as the statistical
channel models and the receiver noise and antenna patterns
(which shape the broadcasting property of the channel).
The performance of wiretap codes for the strong and semantic
secrecy levels can be numerically quantified. Hence, for the
wiretap protected areas it is possible to evaluate the secrecy
capacity for the infinite-length regime or upper bounds for
the finite-length regime. We have introduced a general
wiretap code construction and a randomized hash function
construction and illustrate the performance. In particular we
illustrate the amount of bits of information that such wiretap
code can transmit with unconditional security for realistic
systems. Our results confirm the potential of wiretap coding
as a physical layer security based on information theoretic
metrics and principles.
From a system-level perspective, we have shown that our
proposed wiretap satellite modeling and code design as well
as secrecy analysis methodology are system-independent.
Hence, information-theoretic physical layer security allows
a layered integration of wiretap coding as a sublayer of
the physical layer. Such integration enables to incorporate
additional information-theoretic security protocols running
independently of the communication transmission.
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